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Abstract 
African states in the post-colonial era have undergone notably different rates of 
economic growth and development. I argue that creating a strong legal framework to 
prevent state over-interference in private property is one of the most important public 
policy initiatives African states that have seen high levels of growth have taken. I’ve 
come to this conclusion by studying and reviewing relevant economic and historical 
literature about the relationship between economic growth and strong property rights 
regimes and property rights in Africa since the end of colonialism. I have centered my 
study around Zimbabwe and Botswana because those states have implemented and 
articulated opposing positions regarding property rights, which make them valuable 
states to study in great detail. From this analysis, I’ve concluded that the Botswana 
government has historically exhibited a distinct legal policy position regarding private 
ownership of property. This position has created a series of outcomes which has been 
largely responsible for the high level of economic prosperity Botswana has experienced 
since its independence in nineteen sixty-six. The Zimbabwean government has 
articulated a distinctly different position on the value of securing private property, and 
this has led it to a series of public policy initiatives regarding private property very 
different than the private property regime established in Botswana. This analysis helps 
3 
establish a future framework useful for governments in establishing economies looking 
to develop, and a historical way of judging the utility of large scale redistributions of 
private property. I look for this analysis to help establish a more useful form of analysis 
and rhetoric. 
 
Intro 
 
In the post-imperial era, African states developed economically in profoundly  
 
different ways. A thread woven into all their post-colonial struggles, however, is how to  
 
deal with past injustices, particularly the imperialist exploitation of land appropriated  
 
from  Africans. When colonialism ended, post-colonial African states were left with  
 
high levels of poverty, extreme land and wealth inequality benefitting the descendants  
 
of their white European settlers, and authoritarian and repressive political structures  
 
influenced by colonial institutions. Modern African states dealt with their colonial  
 
legacies by pursuing radically different development policies and engaging in different  
 
kinds of political rhetoric regarding the pace of reform or colonial injustices.  
 
Much persuasive evidence suggests that African countries which pursued  
 
political reform to what they viewed as the lingering effects of colonialism in a gradual  
 
manner, and relatedly and crucially enforced strict protections of property rights, saw  
 
relatively successful political and economic development. In contrast,  
 
countries which made rapid attempts at correcting colonial injustices and  
 
did not protect property rights experienced significant development issues. Why have  
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strong property rights protections had such positive results, and why have certain  
 
African countries undermined property rights in attempting to solve the economic  
 
issues created by imperialism? If property rights are so important for enabling  
 
economic prosperity, why have some governments undermined property rights?  
 
To answer these questions, I examine the cases of Botswana and Zimbabwe -  
 
respectively, a country that has consistently grown its economy since the end of  
 
colonialism and a country that saw initial economic promise follow colonialism fall  
 
apart.In examining the two cases, I find that economic divergences like these cannot  
 
be explained by one factor. Rather, they must be understood by understanding certain  
 
elements such as ideas, histories of individuals, elements of international economics,  
 
and great power politics. I argue that these elements pushed Botswana and Zimbabwe  
 
onto the development paths which they followed, and understanding the divergence  
 
between Botswana and Zimbabwe is valuable to understanding patterns of  
 
international development generally. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Individual leaders, especially in developing states, play a critical role in the  
 
formative economic policies of those states.  In the post-independence period African  
 
states were often led by revolutionaries who were formed intellectually by a struggle  
 
against European powers, while others were led by pragmatists whose motivations  
 
5 
were distinctly non-revolutionary. In Botswana and Zimbabwe, founding leaders  
 
Seretse Khama and Robert Mugabe fit this dual paradigm, but each man is a broader  
 
example of a specific type of leadership character. They shall be studied by  
 
examining literature relating to the role of leadership in developing states.  
 
The temperament of the leaders in post-independence developing states is  
 
critical. Their rhetoric plays an important role in helping their states create a political  
 
culture and political tradition. I argue that Seretse Khama and the Botswanan tribal  
 
leadership, out of which he emerged, is characteristic of the sort of political  
 
leadership capable of protecting property rights and, therefore, sustained economic  
 
development. I also argue that Robert Mugabe’s political character, much of which  
 
was formed during a brutal war with a colonial occupying power, is representative of  
 
the sort of political leadership which rejects gradualist post-colonial political  
 
development and the concept of property rights, and partially from this does not see  
 
sustained development.  
 
As exemplars of revolutionary and pragmatic leadership, Mugabe and Khama,  
 
help illustrate the importance of leadership for postcolonial development. Yet, they  
 
also show that the choices they made as leaders must be understood in historical  
 
context. Examining their choices has the additional advantage of shedding light on  
 
two of the key theories used to explain divergent developmental paths:  Modernization  
 
Theory and Dependency Theory.  Modernization Theory is essential to understanding  
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property rights because it emphasizes the power of  gradual development. In  
 
Modernization Theory developing nations are in many ways similar to developed  
 
nations. The major difference is that developing nations haven’t had as much time to  
 
develop because they are often newly independent following their years of imperialist  
 
control. If Western levels of development are achievable for all countries,  
 
under the modernization paradigm Western methods and, more importantly in this  
 
frame of thought Western models of development should be practiced by developing  
 
countries.  
 
In contrast to modernization theories, dependency theory leads to an entirely  
 
different set of assumptions, some of which might lead to a different perspective of  
 
property rights in development. Scholars of Dependency Theory such as Leslie Stein  
 
argue that the Global South is structurally imbalanced in its relationship with the  
 
Global North . She persuasively argues that conventional economists have neglected  1
 
the influence of dependence of weak states on strong states which has a deep  
 
influence in the form of the international economy.  This assumption reasonably leads  
 
to the notion that these imbalances prevent Western policies for development from  
 
working in the global South. The underdevelopment which leads to a system of  
 
1 ​"Dependency Theories and Underdevelopment", ​Journal of Economic Studies​, 1979, Vol. 6 Issue: 1, 
pp.64-85. 
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dependency has been explored in the work of Andre Gunder Frank . Frank argues that  2
 
the economic logic of the Western development model is pointless in the development  
 
of the global South because developed countries maintain a mercantile-like  
 
relationship with the global South which is inherent to the disparate amount of power  
 
the developed world holds over it in international politics. This neo-mercantilist  
 
relationship hinders market oriented development in the developing world, and requires  
 
action and acknowledgement from the international community to be resolved.  
 
No theory is a perfect representation of the complexity of human  
 
circumstance, but I find these theories crucial to my argument. Although I find  
 
property rights protection to be successful to economic development, dependency  
 
theory offers a compelling logic that old Eurocentric systems and arguments for  
 
property rights are unjust and hypocritical. The non-gradualist is compelling and often  
 
humane. All theories of development, however, look to help African countries build  
 
successful public institutions. The World Bank has been mocked by some for calling  
 
on countries to “add institutions and stir ,” as economist Deirdre Mccloskey says. But  3
 
without acknowledging the importance of public institutions all development theories  
 
lose coherence. This is important to understand in the context of Africa. I argue that  
 
institutions in all of post-independence Africa were created abruptly. Therefore, they  
 
did not have long periods of development as institutions in countries in the West did,  
2Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment (​New England Free Press: 1966) 
3 Deirdre Mccloskely, ​Bourgeois Equality​, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 224 
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institutions which had the liberty of a long period of trial and error. African countries  
 
becoming independent nation states in the 1960’s needed institutions crafted rapidly  
 
to meet the needs of the twentieth century economy, and the urgency of this process  
 
made African public institutions crucial to their countries development paths.  
 
Much has been written about the evolution and failure of African institutions  
 
such as courts, elections, and state economic agencies, but not all African countries  
 
have seen their institutions breakdown. The question, which is inadequately answered  
 
in the existing literature, is why certain African countries have developed  
 
institutions so much more successfully than others. I argue that Botswana’s property  
 
rights protections are a product of its colonial institutions which evolved  
 
during a period when Britain governed under a policy similar to  
 
general neglect . Zimbabwe’s institutional development was profoundly different than  4
 
Botswana’s. Many of its institutions are alien to its indigenous culture. Some are even  
 
the direct legacy of colonial authoritarianism.  
 
The legacy of colonialism in Africa cannot be broken purely into the logic of  
 
institutions and resources extracted. The nature of the colonial state is beyond  
 
something that can be viewed through a pure sort of cost benefit analysis. The states  
 
themselves had a fundamental character. The Rhodesian leadership was  
 
4 Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail, (Crown Publishing House, 2012), 272 
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quasi-totalitarian and deeply racist. It broke from the British government because of  
 
its extremity, and viewed itself as a bulwark as what it saw as barbarism. This  
 
totalitarian culture political did not die when Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith gave  
 
control of the government to Robert Mugabe. Mugabe and Smith are different  
 
men. Mugabe did not model himself after Smith but the ramifications of decades of  
 
quasi-totalitarian political cultural in Rhodesia for postcolonial politics must be  
 
explored. This political climate created the struggle in which modern Zimbabwe was 
 
founded and the nature of it is linked to Zimbabwe’s modern political culture. 
 
The territory of Botswana was governed more liberally by the British government as  
 
its tribal leadership cunningly avoided domination by the ruthless British diamond  
 
magnate Cecil Rhodes. The differing relationships between the colonial regime and  
 
the local population in each case, I argue, has had long-term impact on property rights  
 
in each instance and how that impacted economic development in each country.  
  
Property Rights regimes in Africa are not created by one factor. They are  
 
influenced and created by many elements. Policy is important, but policy would  
 
be meaningless without distinct leaders, countries’ political cultures, international  
 
economics, and history. Thus, I argue, each of these factors have played a role in  
 
forming the property rights regimes of modern African states. These factors should  
 
not be viewed hierarchically. They are independently important in different ways.  
 
certain mixes create property rights regimes and others lead to regimes attacking  
10 
 
property rights. This begs a prior question, though: why are property rights  
 
important? I turn to that question in the next section. 
  
Argument  
 
Property rights have a simple definition. Property  
 
rights, economist Armen Alchian said, are “a method of assigning to particular  
 
individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for specific goods, any use from a nonprohibited 
 
class of uses.”  As suggested in the preceding remarks the concepts of  5
 
“authority” and of “nonprohibited” rely on some concept of enforcement or inducement  
 
to respect the assignment and scope of prohibited choice. I define property rights in  
 
my argument as protection against other people’s choosing how to use resources  
 
owned by another.  
 
States securing property rights, in all sorts of structurally varying  
 
economies, helps create economic growth. Why is this so? According to the  
 
economist Ronald Coase, in his seminal theory of property rights, ​where there is a  
 
conflict of property rights, parties can bargain or negotiate terms that are  
 
more beneficial to both parties than the outcome of any assigned property rights .  6
 
5 Gerald P. O Driscoll, Jr, “Economic Freedom: The Path to Development.” ​Foundation For Economic 
Freedom​, April 1, 2005. 
6 ​Coase Theorem,​Encyclopedia of Law and Economics​, 1-6.2016.Springer New York 
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This essentially means that individuals can come to agreements about best use of  
 
their property on their own more efficiently than any outside institution can. The logic  
 
and theories behind the importance of property rights all rest upon the same principle.  
 
Individuals use resources they’ve cultivated themselves with more care than those  
 
who have no relationship to them. This principle applies to the developing world as it  
 
does to the developed. Capital, as much as it can vary from agricultural economies to  
 
industrial ones, is taken better care of by those who depend on its uses than a third  
 
party without the same level of interest in the capital. People care about and  
 
understand the strengths and deficiencies of their own property. This idea is an  
 
assumption about human psychology which is universal. It would apply to all  
 
individuals and all sorts of non-financial capital which they might utilize.  
  
These theoretical assumptions often bear out empirically. For example,  
 
countries with strong property rights on average are significantly wealthier than  
 
countries with weak property rights. In 2003, the GDP per capita in countries with  
 
strong property rights was twice that of countries with weak property rights. The  
 
International Property Rights Index each year ranks every country in the world by their  
 
commitment to property rights. The countries with the ten highest rankings all have  
 
GDPs Per Capita above $40,000 which puts them among the richest countries in the  
 
world.  To be sure, correlation is not causation. Finland and Singapore, are not rich  7
7 ​International Property Rights Index​, International Property Rights Index 2017. Accessed February 28, 
2018. ​https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/countries​,  
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only because their governments gave their citizens authority to use specific goods  
 
and neither is Botswana. Yet, I argue that the correlation between property rights and  
 
economic growth is large enough to suggest that they do contribute to  
 
growth. Property rights in many African countries, to the limited extent that they’ve  
 
been enforced, show a relationship with successful economic policy similar to the one  
 
found in the rest of the world.  For instance,  Rwanda has the 33rd most secure  
 
property rights (According to the International Property Rights Index) in the world and  
 
is growing at a rate of 7.18% per year. Botswana has the 44th most secure property  
 
rights in the world and has grown at extraordinary rate for decades since  
 
independence.  
 
Given its history with colonialism, however, property rights on the African  
 
continent have often had a more complicated history than property rights protections  
 
in the European countries from which the original economic models were developed.  
 
Throughout African history arguments for property rights have been hypocritically  
 
used by colonialists who deprived native Africans of their property. Wealthy white  
 
settlers came upon their property through expropriation with little if any recompense  
 
and they justified the inequality this expropriation created using the arguments for  
 
property rights. This injustice is historical fact, and it is a dilemma for any proponent  
 
of property rights. How can a government not take action to quickly remedy an  
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injustice perpetrated against its people? Property rights as a concept do not argue  
 
against the justice of this sentiment. The logic for them does not even necessarily  
 
call for a fair-minded and justice-centered redistribution of property but all attempts, if  
 
they are to be done, call for gradualism. This is the key to property oriented gradualist  
 
development. My research and exploration of my test countries examines historical  
 
examples of  developing-world property decisions and give clarity to how they came to  
 
be.  
 
If the empirical evidence for property rights is solid and difficult to take issue  
 
with, why would a state consciously undermine them? This is the heart of my  
 
question. There are two obvious reasons which are well connected to each other.  
 
The first is to gain moral support by appearing to promote fairness. This might be  
 
done to resolve the perceived cruelties of the past. The second is to create a certain  
 
sort of efficiency. In the opinions of post colonial governments, land inequities might  
 
be bad for their current economies and a more equal distribution of land might make  
 
more of their people successful which would improve the efficiency of their economies  
 
as whole entities. Developing countries want to prove that their solving past injustices  
 
while benefiting their countries economies in the future. I argue that these motives are  
 
evident in my case studies, but they were overcome by the economic argument for  
 
property rights.  
 
Research Design 
14 
 
I explore why some governments in former British colonies protected property  
 
rights and why some have not through the cases of Botswana and Zimbabwe. These  
 
countries have gone through periods of development which will illustrate the benefits  
 
of protecting property rights and the costs of sabotaging them. Botswana and  
 
Zimbabwe have seen drastically different levels of post independence economic  
 
development, which would have been hard to foresee from analyzing their material  
 
conditions when each country reached independence. Since independence, Botswana  
 
has had one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world averaging about 9%  
 
growth from 1966 to 1999.  This growth started immediately after its independence. In  8
 
1960, while Botswana was still part of the British Empire, its GDP per capita was  
 
about $60 making it one of the poorest countries in the world.  Twenty-six years later,  9
 
in 1986, its GDP per capita was about $1,200 which represents a 2,000 percent  
 
increase.  This is a remarkable trend and one of the greatest short term periods of  10
 
economic success in human history. Botswana is vital to this analysis because its  
 
sustained economic growth started almost immediately at its independence. In 1966,  
 
at its independence, Botswana’s GDP per capita was $80 and in 1976, ten years after  
 
its independence, it was $500 .  11
8 “Botswana GDP,” Trading Economics, Accessed March 24, 2018. 
https://tradingeconomics.com/botswana/gdp. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita rose from 1966 to 1976 as well, from $297 to to  
 
$543. But in the ten years after its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita  
 
actually shrank by about fifty percent, and is today the same as what it was in 1980.   12
 
The difference between Botswana and Zimbabwe is stark.The effects of these  
 
divergent post-independence paths are even clearer when viewed through the  
 
Botswanan and Zimbabwean labor forces. Unemployment in Botswana is consistently  
 
under 20%, which is one of the lowest in Africa.  Thirty years ago Botswana’s  13
 
illiteracy rate was over seventy percent and now it has the fourth highest literacy rate  
 
in Africa.  Zimbabwe failing in essentially every metric which measures public  14
 
wellbeing. The human cost of this is intense.  
 
How can this difference be explained? I argue in the remainder of the thesis 
 
that Botswana’s respect for property rights in its development played a major role in  
 
its economic success. By contrast, the failure of Zimbabwe’s ruling party to protect  
 
property rights and its ideological attack on them as a concept has been a driving  
 
reason for its failure to see any real sustained economic growth. We shall see this  
 
divergence in the cases that follow. 
 
 
12 “Zimbabwe GDP” Trading Economics. Accessed March 28, 2018. 
https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/gdp 
13 
14 “The Ten Most Illiterate Countries in Africa.” World Atlas. Accessed April 2, 2018. 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-most-literate-countries-of-africa.html 
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Case Study Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe was formed by exploitative and nationalistic elements within  
 
British society and a deep understanding of those elements is necessary to  
 
understand the way independent Zimbabwe treated property rights. However, there  
 
is no single reason for why Zimbabwe pushed the sort of property rights regime it  
 
Did. Rather, a multifaceted account of the actions of the actors that created its early  
 
politics is necessary for understanding why the post-colonial regime ultimately chose  
 
to violate the country’s property rights regime.  
 
The necessary place to start this exploration is with Cecil Rhodes, one  
 
of the most influential capitalists in the history of the British Empire. Cecil Rhodes  
 
was hugely important to the development of the western world. He was a British  
 
diamond magnate  crucial to the founding of Zimbabwe. An influential British editor  
 
met him in 1892 and characterized him in a telling way. “Size was the first external  
 
impression you received of him. There was something in his rather leonine head and  
 
massive loose pose which raised him to heroic proportions.”  Although admired by  15
 
this particular reporter, Rhodes isn’t typically described in admiring terms today. He  
 
was a ruthless in his practices and his accumulation of power. However, his  
 
importance to history cannot be ignored.  
15 The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and The Pursuit of Power by Robert I. Rotberg. 1988. Oxford Press, 4. 
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Cecil Rhodes formed Rhodesia, contemporary Zimbabwe’s predecessor, in a  
 
rush for gold, which was found in its southern Matabeland. The Matabeland chief  
 
Lobelunga was a valuable asset for Rhodes to influence. Similar to Belgium’s use of  
 
the Congo as a corporate enterprise, Cecil ​Rhodes’ new territory was technically  
 
beholden to the British government, which halfheartedly attempted to govern its  
 
imperial properties under a set of standards which they tried to enforce on Rhodes’  
 
settlers. The British administration of Matabeland was supposed to offer some benefit  
 
to its Natives. Yet, despite Rhodesia’s value to the Crown,  the British government’s  
 
standards of governance were poor. It could call for the humane governance of a  
 
corporate territory but it couldn’t enforce its declared principles. Perhaps most  
 
importantly, the settlers attacked the Matabeland tribal government, setting an early  
 
division among settlers and indigenous groups over land.  This was the beginning of  16
 
a striking pattern similar to Robert Mugabe’s nationalistic form of governance nearly a  
 
century later. Thus, modern Zimbabwe was formed in a series of conflicts.  
 
The next conflict to control Rhodesia was between Cecil Rhodes’ company  
 
and the settlers inhabiting it. “For several decades after the occupation of  
 
Mashonaland and Matabeland, members of the settler bourgeoisie were clearer about  
 
what they were not than what they were. They claimed they were neither slaves of the  
 
16 The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1967-1981: a political history of incursion in Southern Rhodesia. 
Sibanda, Elikiam. 2005. 40-70. 
18 
chartered company or passing adventurers. ” The British government thought they  17
 
could regulate the actions of Cecil Rhodes, and Rhodes thought he had could control  
 
the passions of his own employees. Neither notion was entirely true. Thousands of  
 
miles from London the political passions of a group of settlers overcame Rhodes’s  
 
interests in large part because of the value of Rhodesian land. The settlers followed a  
 
form of nationalism of a nation that they created. They saw themselves as the rightful  
 
settlers of an independent nation, despite their interference in the property of the  
 
indigenous Africans.  
 
 British control through Rhodesia’s charter was legally strong. The British 
government gave itself a veto over all of Cecil Rhodes’ actions. His corporate state was 
under political control, which theoretically offered some protections to the local  African 
population, but Cecil Rhodes died at the age of forty nine. Skeptical of the British 
government, Rhodesian settlers took governance into their own hands. Since 
Rhodesian settlers interfered with the initial agreement Rhodes made with the 
Matabeland tribal leaders, they’d created a legislative council and twenty years after 
Rhodes’ death the Rhodesian settlers voted to establish themselves as an independent 
political entity, separate from the deceased Rhodes’ organization and separate from 
South Africa. Mirroring other independence debates, Rhodesians voted against obvious 
economic benefits offered to them from South Africa as the South African government 
offered Rhodesia significant development as an incentive for it to form a union. The 
17 Jeffrey Ira Herbst, ​State Politics in Zimbabwe,​ (Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe Press), 1-37. 
19 
South African government, however, was attacked by the Rhodesian labour movement 
with the Secretary of the Rhodesian Railways Workers Union saying, “General Smuts 
has been held up by the Capitalistic press as a saviour of nations . . . [but] the footsteps 
of the Prime Minister drip with blood. In 1913 the strike and shooting followed by the 
illegal deportations of labour leaders . . . The only crime of these labour leaders was 
that they struck for a living wage . . . The next was the native trouble at Port Elizabeth, 
which required more shooting; then Bulhoek, which ‘victory’ was won by more shooting. 
Now the Rand trouble — shooting once more . . . These are the usual tactics employed 
by this great statesman to educate the working man.”   18
This new Southern Rhodesia immediately codified restrictions on the property 
rights of black Africans. The South Rhodesian government was deeply fixated on the 
quality of Rhodesian land. Geographically, the arable land in Zimbabwe receives 
different amounts of rainfall. The low rainfall areas are hard to farm, while the high 
rainfall ones are extremely valuable. The Land Apportionment act of 1930 gave legal 
rights to the more favorable land and a majority of all Rhodesian farmable land to white 
Rhodesians. This law, along with many other Rhodesian actions was interwoven with a 
state focused nationalism which grew stronger as Rhodesia developed.  
What role did this nationalism play in the forming of Rhodesia and what effect did 
this have on the nature of the post-colonial state? How did this history, both legal and 
cultural, affect the property rights regime of the Zimbabwean nation driven by Robert 
Mugabe? What combination of laws and culture were pushing at Robert Mugabe when 
18 Elaine Lee, “An Analysis of the Rhodesian Referendum, 1922.” The Journal of The Central African 
Historical Association, Vol 8. 1977, 81 
20 
he interfered with his state’s property rights? Answering these questions provides clarity 
on the post-colonial era, which can be understood by exploring the legacy of Rhodesian 
Prime Minister Ian Smith, an infamous imperialist and dark symbol for the debate about 
how Zimbabwean property rights should be protected. 
Ian Smith came to power in a coup as a representative of the most hardline white 
nationalist element of the Rhodesian government  and immediately broke from Britain. 19
The BBC article about him on the day of his claiming independence opens, “Prime 
Minister Ian Smith, has illegally severed its links with the British Crown.”  This was a 20
profound moment. Britain was imperialist but proved itself committed to certain legalistic 
norms or at least a certain legalistic aesthetic. By contrast, under Smith, Rhodesia 
represented a bulwark against the possibility of a legally-regulated, multi-racial 
democracy.  He did so in rather flamboyant language proclaiming, “"There can be no 
happiness in a country while the absurd situation continues to exist where people, such 
as ourselves, who have ruled themselves with an impeccable record for over 40 years, 
are denied what is freely granted to other countries."  
The British government at the point was asked by Zimbabwean opposition 
organizations ZANU and ZAPU to intervene in the Rhodesian declaration of 
independence but Britain instead issued a series of sanctions. In the face of worsening 
repression and seeing little hope from Britain, the liberation forces took to armed 
struggle. The struggle only served to harden the resolve of hardliners like Smith. As he 
said, “There can be no solution to our racial problems while African nationalists believe 
19 Dan van der Vat, “Ian Smith,” ​The Guardian​, November 21, 2007. 
20 ​BBC​, On This Day 1950-2005, 1965: Rhodesia Breaks from UK. 
21 
that, provided they stirred up sufficient trouble, they will be able to blackmail the British 
Government into bringing about a miracle on their behalf by handing the country over to 
irresponsible rule.”   21
For Smith, this was a kind of “civilizational” struggle. He said at the time, “We 
have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization, and Christianity; and in the 
spirit of this belief we have this day assumed our sovereign independence. God bless 
you all.” He associates the Rhodesian nation with civilization in the abstract. His 
sentiments contain a deeply nationalist tone, one which was the logical culmination of 
the fundamental, distinct, nationalist character of the Rhodesian state.  
This is the third of three historical pressures pushing on what was then soon to 
be Zimbabwe. Its settlers were nationalistic. Its laws were deeply oppressive and 
restrictive and its politicians promoted a white nationalism which was central to the 
founding of its state. These elements fueled nationalist forces like ZANU, led by Robert 
Mugabe, which ultimately toppled the Rhodesian state. It also helps us understand why, 
after attaining power following Zimbawean independence, he attacked settlers’ property 
rights in the totalizing manner that he did.  
In 1980, Robert Mugabe and his political allies underwent the messy process of 
coming to a political solution with the white Rhodesian government. Assisted by the 
British, they worked out a political solution. A primary question was how Mugabe’s 
government would treat the white Rhodesian farmers. He had said that “none of the 
21 “Modern History Sourcebook: Rhodesia: Unilateral Declaration of Independence Documents, 1965.” 
Fordham University, Accessed April 12, 2018. 
22 
white exploiters would be able to keep an acre.”  This was an issue that the 22
international economy was concerned with. Ian Smith’s government had been 
sanctioned by the United Nations and a massive land reform would hurt independent 
Zimbabwe’s ability to export its resources. The British government convinced Mugabe to 
include a crucial condition to the new Zimbabwean constitution. The Zimbabwean 
government agreed to wait ten years to attempt land reform.   23
Despite the agreement to hold-off on land reform, the agreement had a series of 
adverse effects. Under the original constitution and waiting period the Zimbabwean 
government could offer just compensation to the white farmers for their land but their 
options were still limited by the initial decree. The new Zimbabwean government initially 
offered a slowly paced land reform, and its GDP did not suffer. This relative stability 
would prove to be an anomaly, however. The Mugabe regime remained oriented 
towards an aggressive redistribution of property, despite the early gradualism with 
which it approached the issue. They were fighting people they viewed as an enemy. 
The war was not over politically for Robert Mugabe and many other individuals in the 
Zimbabwean ruling party. Mugabe was initially conciliatory towards white settlers and 
even some old elements of the Ian Smith regime. Smith even praised him when they 
met in Smith’s old age. This is what must be understood about Robert Mugabe’s 
character. He showed charm and even rhetorical brilliance. Ian Smith led a war against 
Mugabe’s forces but when he met him after the British orchestrated peace agreement 
22 Chris McGreal, “The Trail from Lancaster House,” ​The Guardian​, January 15, 2002. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/16/zimbabwe.chrismcgreal 
23 Ibid. 
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he said, “​Here's this chap, and he was speaking like a sophisticated, balanced, sensible 
man. I thought: if he practises what he preaches, then it will be fine.”   24
Despite Mugabe’s strength of personality, there were two questions that 
Zimbabwean government had to answer, which were fundamental to the sort of post 
colonial land reform that all newly independent nations faced: What sort of policy 
towards landowners who benefited from racist-imperialist laws is just and what effect 
would property redistribution have on their economies? The two questions are related. 
Zimbabwe was barred from the uncompensated taking of property in its initial 
constitution but it could buy white landowners’ land at a fair value with funds offered by 
the British government.  This constitution offered a number of forms of protection 25
against the taking of private property and the government did not immediately attempt a 
large scale redistribution of land. In the 1980s, when Robert Mugabe was killing his 
political rivals in Matabeleland, Zimbabwean wealth had not been completely destroyed 
as it later was to be. In 1980,y when Robert Mugabe came to power Zimbabwean GDP 
per capita stood at about $1100. In 1990, one it had grown to $1300.   26
Yet, in the ten years after Mugabe came to power the land question loomed large 
in Zimbabwean politics. Distribution of land was a major issue for Zimbabwe throughout 
its history as a nation state. The mechanisms of governance by its white settlers were 
more intrusive than in other parts of Africa, and its independence was fiercer and more 
violent than in many other post-colonial countries. The colonial figures of Rhodesian 
24 Marian Tupy, “Botswana and Zimbabwe A Tale of Two Countries.  May 14, 2008. Cato Institute/The 
American.  
25  Martin Meredith, “Mugabe, Power, Plunder, and The Struggle for Zimbabwe,(​PublicAffairs; 1st edition: 
September 25, 2007)​, 122. 
26“Zimbabwe GDP” Trading Economics. Accessed April 20, 2018. 
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history cut psychologically jarring symbols, and Mugabe was schooled by ware. But 
Zimbabwe’s unique history gave the land reform itself its distinct characteristics which 
were important to the economic well-being and property rights of its people.  
When Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980 white farmers were 
disproportionately responsible for Zimbabwe’s national production. “6,000  white 
farmers grew 90 percent of marketed maize, the main staple; 90 percent of cotton, the 
main industrial crop; and virtually all tobacco and other export crops, including wheat 
coffee, tea and sugar, accounting all and all for one third of total exports. White farmers 
employed about a third of the labor earning force, some 271,000 people in 1980.”  And 27
the constitutional protection against land reform stood. However, 1990 was an election 
year for Mugabe and in the context of land in Zimbabwe’s history, he appeared to see 
the redistribution of it as an issue he could use to gain popularity. The scope of the 
Zimbabwean government’s legal power grew over time. In December 1990, the 
Zimbabwean parliament amended its constitution to allow the government to confiscate 
land and fix the price of that they would buy it for. Four thousand white farmers met with 
Agriculture Secretary Witness Mangwende in January of 1991. Magwende told them, 
“The land question is a time bomb which must be solved now. The time for 
energy-consuming debates on the desirability or otherwise of this programme has run 
out. The only useful debate that the government is willing to entertain is about 
implementation modalities.”  “Bomb” implies a belief that something worse would 28
27 Martin Meredith, “Mugabe, Power, Plunder, and The Struggle for Zimbabwe,(​PublicAffairs; 1st edition: 
September 25, 2007)​, 111. 
28Martin Meredith, “Mugabe, Power, Plunder, and The Struggle for Zimbabwe,(​PublicAffairs; 1st edition: 
September 25, 2007)​, 123. 
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happen if the government failed to issue some sort of land reform and the reference to 
implementation modalities begets a certain understanding of practicality by 
Mangwende. But in this analysis implementation and scope define the meaning of the 
term “land reform.”  This concept of land reform devolved further, and the Zimbabwean 
constitution was further amended. The Zimbabwean constitution initially gave anyone 
whose land was taken away a means of petitioning the government. Article III Section 
Sixteen D of the Zimbabwean constitution stated, taking land “​requires the acquiring 
authority, if the acquisition is contested, to apply to the High Court or some other court 
before, or not later than thirty days after, the acquisition for an order confirming the 
acquisition.” This was amended out of Zimbabwe’s constitution in 1990 because the 
Zimbabwean high court was very critical of Zimbabwe’s plans. Just retired Supreme 
Court Justice Enoch Dumbutshena said Mugabe’s land reform “flies in the face of all 
forms of modern society and the rule of law.”  And land reform was progressing rapidly. 29
The scope of the control the government gave itself and the size of the disruption of 
capital for farm owners increased dramatically throughout the 1990s.  In 1993, Mugabe 
gave a speech saying, “If white settlers took the land without paying, we can in a similar 
way take the land without paying.”  This statement is an attack on the principle of 30
legality. It is a justification of behavior using the actions of the white Rhodesian settlers. 
But with this ideology and rhetoric, as the conception of the scope of the land reform 
grew so did the corruption of those implementing it. Witness Mangwende, who 
29 Martin Meredith, “Mugabe, Power, Plunder, and The Struggle for Zimbabwe,(​PublicAffairs; 1st edition: 
September 25, 2007)​, 122.. 
30Martin Meredith, “Mugabe, Power, Plunder, and The Struggle for Zimbabwe,(​PublicAffairs; 1st edition: 
September 25, 2007)​, 126 
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threatened the landowners of a time bomb, was caught leasing a farm taken from a 
white farmer which the government claimed was given to landless peasants.”  This was 31
also at a time when Mugabe gave his inner cabinet large pay raises. “In 1995 the 
cabinet awarded all Mugabe ministers and members of parliament large pay raises of 
133 percent.”  The Mugabe land reform increased the political power of the central 32
government but it materially benefitted them as well. They saw it as the purest political 
question the country had to answer. And Zimbabwe’s economy (in terms of GDP per 
capita) actually shrank as the land reform continued. In the year 2000, the GDP per 
capita of Zimbabwe was slightly smaller than it was in the year 1990.  33
In the first decade of the 21st century the scope of Zimbabwe’s land reform 
would grow larger than it had in the last decade of the twentieth. One of its largest 
issues is that it gave outsized benefits to Zimbabwe’s elite. The rhetoric around land 
reform was populist but the policy often failed to benefit those who many would argue 
had been most harmed by Rhodesian history. Catherine Boone writes about the top 
down nature of Zimbabwe’s land efforts, the “Fast Track program was not a grassroots 
initiative driven by organized constituencies of small scale farmers struggling with 
problems of land access and and landlessness. Fast Track farm takeovers of 
2000-2005 happened as a government initiative.”  Land became what Zimbabwe 34
based its idea of international economics around. In the year 2000 Mugabe’s political 
31Martin Meredith, “Mugabe, Power, Plunder, and The Struggle for Zimbabwe,(​PublicAffairs; 1st edition: 
September 25, 2007)​, 126 
32Martin Meredith, “Mugabe, Power, Plunder, and The Struggle for Zimbabwe,(​PublicAffairs; 1st edition: 
September 25, 2007)​, 127 
33 “Zimbabwe GDP” Trading Economics. Accessed May 10, 2018. 
34 Catherine Boone, ​Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics​, 
(Cambridge University Press: 2014), 297. 
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party campaigned on the slogan: “land is the economy and the economy is land.”  This 35
logic contradicts the argument for property rights. But on Mugabe’s terms the Fast Track 
addition to land reform was quite successful. In 2004, more than ninety percent of white 
owned land had been transferred to black farmers.  This led to a reduction in 36
Zimbabwe’s economy and a reduction in Zimbabwe’s productive capabilities. In the year 
2008, Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita was about half as much as it was in 2000.  This 37
coincided with a massive decrease in Zimbabwean production. “The tobacco industry, 
which was Zimbabwe’s single largest generator of foreign exchange and accounted for 
almost a third of Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings in 2000, has almost completely 
collapsed. The crop that earned some US$600 million in 2000 generated less than 
US$125 million in 2007.”  The period of the accelerating land reform saw Zimbabwe fall 38
behind and deeply harm its attempts for successful economic development. 
Zimbabwe’s government acted in its land reform to solve a situation it did not 
cause and many would argue deserved government action. But all attempts to take and 
redistribute physical property, in varying degrees, contradict the argument for the 
economic benefits of property rights. Mugabe’s land reform was not done legalistically. 
This uncertainty increased its economic issues. It was also driven by political actors who 
were working to solve political concerns. The rhetoric of violence by the government 
blurred the line between attack on old enemies and necessary redistribution. This 
35 “Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics.” Catherine Boone. 
(Cambridge University Press:2014), 303. 
36  “Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics.” Catherine Boone. 
(Cambridge University Press:2014), 305. 
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rhetoric also protected large-scale opportunities for corruption by Zimbabwean political 
elite, which were opportunities they took. These actions greatly harmed Zimbabwe’s 
productive capabilities and economic output, which had deeply negative consequences 
for the real wealth of its citizens. This offers much to be learned in understanding land 
reform and development. 
 
Botswana 
Botswana’s development history has been markedly different from Zimbabwe’s. 
It’s history in colonialism was different and less severe. The English had far less 
influence in Botswana than they did in Zimbabwe. Botswana was not viewed as as an 
asset for resources in the same way Zimbabwe was. It was also governed as a 
protectorate of the British government not as a territory of Cecil Rhodes. This history 
allowed it to incorporate some of its indigenous traditions into its modern style of 
governance. It created a political culture which was markedly different from Zimbabwe’s. 
This culture saw public policy and particularly a perspective on property rights that was 
more open and liberal than Zimbabwe’s. Botswana’s protection of property rights is one 
of the major reasons it never had a two decade period of economic regression as 
Zimbabwe did after its attempted land reform. It also one of the most important reasons 
why Botswana has seen dramatic GDP growth since its founding. Analyzing Botswana, 
therefore, helps understand how political culture and its relationship to property rights 
can be so valuable to a developing country 
29 
The path to developing property rights protections extends far back in African 
history, specifically in the relatively light colonial presence in Botswana compared to 
Zimbabwe. As in Zimbabwe, Cecil Rhodes was important to the founding of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, though he never actually gained political control of it. As 
Rhodes tried to take control of the territory, Batswanna tribal leaders made a pragmatic 
political decision. They embraced the British government. “The chiefs knew that only 
disaster and exploitation lay ahead for territories if they fell under the control of Rhodes. 
Though it was impossible for them to defeat Rhodes militarily, they were determined to 
fight him any way they could. They decided to opt for the lesser of two evils: greater 
control by the British rather than annexation by Rhodes.”  They were successful and 39
Bechuanaland was put under the protection of Queen Victoria who’s government 
proclaimed, “The Queen shall appoint an officer to reside with them. The chiefs will rule 
their own people much as at present.”  This dynamic was partially the luck of British 40
disinterest. It was a subtler form of colonial governance than in other parts of Africa. 
Botswanan citizens were exposed to relatively less colonial violence than elsewhere 
Africa, but British neglect allowed their pre-colonial African governance institutions to 
develop with comparative freedom. People indigenous to Bechuanaland interacted with 
British settlers but the political context to their early interactions was very different than 
interactions between Africans and Europeans in much of Africa. 
British missionaries were active in Bechuanaland. They were active in much of 
Africa but in Bechuanaland they were to practice a sort of liberal internationalism. They 
39  Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail, (Crown Publishing House, 2012), 272 
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wanted the British government to take a strong hand in protecting the Tswana people. 
”What should be, however, emphasized is the fact that the power to which the 
missionaries looked was the secular force of British imperialism. Already since the 
middle of the 19th century they called upon the British government to preserve their 
mission field from Boer expansion from the Transvaal.”  The missionary rhetoric 41
repeatedly called for a peaceful form of British protection of the Tswana people from 
other threats. This may have involved a certain self interest by the missionaries. The 
English could not preach safely in German territory but the British government was 
largely uninterested in control of Beuchanaland and did not deify its land the way 
Rhodes did to his other conquest. At the end of 1882 the British Lord Debry even 
declared: "Bechuanaland is of no value for us... for any Imperial purposes ... it is of no 
consequence to us whether the Boers or Native Chiefs are in possession."  These 42
competing influences played a crucial role in understanding the largely unobtrusive role 
that the British government was to play in the future governance of Botswana. 
The British influences in Botswana did not destroy Botswana’s institutions which 
developed politically in ways similar to successful nation states. They were marked by a 
period of pragmatic economic cooperation with the British. The Botswanan tribal 
leadership was able to exploit British realpolitik as a force for the pragmatic protection of 
their society. In direct contrast to Rhodesia, Ian Smith’s “fight for civilization” was not to 
take place in Botswana.  
41 Henryk Zins,”The international context of the creation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885,” Pula 
Journal of African Studies. Vol 11. No 1. 1997, 56. 
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This was to lead to the coming of a political leader very different in temperament 
than Robert Mugabe. Seretse Khama was a different sort of person than Robert 
Mugabe, but the differences are more meaningful than just that of their mere individual 
psychologies. Khama came to power in a society that experienced a very different 
rhetorical understanding of property. This history denied Botswana’s leadership of any 
rhetorical justification of a massive land reform effort. ​Seretse Khama is famous for his 
bold marriage to the English clerk Ruth Williams, but he should also be remembered for 
implementing a governmental system which borrowed from the English democracy 
while conservatively allowing some pre-imperial Botswanan institutions to flourish. 
Khama is also important, however, in that he was uniquely able to link Botswanan tribal 
history to public policy lifted from European liberal democracy. Seretse Khama was the 
grandson of Khama III, the king of the Bamangwato people. He studied at Oxford. Like 
his ancestors, Seretse Khama was a notable pragmatist. And he suffered no war. There 
was no individual enemy to foster trauma and concentrated antipathy.  
Khama was able to unify Botswanan society partially because of his heritage. 
The tribal leaders of his country were comfortable supporting a man of his background. 
“The chiefs’ disempowerment was eased by Seretse Khama himself being the chief of 
the country’s largest tribe.”  Khama instituted a parliamentary democracy while keeping 43
Tswana democratic councils and some elements of their customary law. While doing 
this, formal tribal power was taken away in a series of legislative acts. This is 
43Valentin Siedler, “Why did Botswana End Up With Good Institutions: The Role of Culture in Colonial 
Rule” V Institute for Economic and Social History. Vienna University of Business, 25. 
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meaningful because it suggests that Botswana would be capable of acting legalistically 
while seeing its institutions act in an orderly and gradualist fashion. 
Botswana was not as overtly nationalistic as Zimbabwe. This created a  political 
culture which helped create a pragmatic form of governance. This allowed for an 
allowance of foreign labor. “In 1964, four years after Botswana’s independence 
expatriates filled 75% of all senior and middle management positions in public services.”
 This is similar to other African countries which very often saw members of their former 44
colonialist countries remain in key roles in their emerging post-colonial nations. This 
culture and history contributed to the reasons that Seretse Khama acted in as gradual a 
manner as he did in his country’s early post independence period.  
For example, in 1970, five years after Botswana  
 
achieved its, independence Seretse Khama gave an address in Sweden in which he  
 
said,   
 
“African countries have formally stated that their guiding ideology is          
socialism. This label, even if qualified by the adjective "African" can have            
little meaning for the majority of our people. Furthermore socialism is an            
ideology to which leaders as various as Stalin and Dubcek, Ulbricht and            
Willi Brandt, Nasser and Ben Gurion, Harold Wilson and Fidel Castro have            
all laid claim.”   45
 
This is a critique of large scale redistribution as a method of reform and it is a sign of  
 
a commitment to gradualist development.  
 
In a similar vein, Khama discusses inequality in his country:  
 
“Our concern to reconcile economic development with social justice poses          
many such dilemmas. Botswana is justly famous for its cattle, and every            
Botswanan is popularly supposed to own cattle, yet this is not the case.             
44Ibid.  
45 Seretse Khama, “Botswana A Developing Democracy In Southern Africa,” Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, 5. 
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Over half the national horde is owned by men with more than fifty cattle,              
and nearly, 14,000 out of a total of nearly 48,000 farmers in the tribal              
areas, where 86 percent of our cattle are grazed, have no cattle. But this              
does not mean that we are divided up between big ranchers and landless             
peasants. The traditional system has a strong welfare element which          
helps to offset the apparent economic imbalance. Thus under the mafiaa           
system poorer people who suffered disproportionately during the drought         
can go to someone who is better off and ask him to let them look after                
some of his cattle.”   46
 
This is an ideological rejection of the urge to act rapidly but it is also misleading  
 
without being properly viewed through Botswana’s history. Khama’s rejection of large  
 
state oriented redistribution of property is really an acceptance of the range of public  
 
policy options available to him. The history of Botswana did not force it to counter a  
 
state-oriented narrative. It could develop its institutions in ways similar to liberal  
 
democracies partially because it was not as abused by imperialists as violently as  
 
Zimbabwe. This is a great difference in states like Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
 
Botswana did not have a forced need to answer. It could view its development in  
 
terms of empirical economic growth instead of having to fulfill the needs of a  
 
subjective social justice which was only realized through trauma. Seretse Khama was  
 
a unique historical individual but history and the the nature of post imperial politics did  
 
more to shape his and Robert Mugabe’s actions than perhaps anything else.  
 
However, Botswana was also formed by its resources, which influenced the formation  
 
of a very different style of governance than that created by the post-independence  
 
leadership in Zimbabwe. 
46 Seretse Khama, “Botswana A Developing Democracy In Southern Africa,” Scandinavian Institute of 
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This difference in governing needs helps us account for the different role the 
state played in the economy in each country. Botswana has a substantial amount of 
diamonds, which has been a major part of its economy since its initial independence. 
“Over the past ten years, the mining sector has contributed 38.5% to GDP. Diamond 
exports, Botswana’s main source of foreign exchange, averaged 75% of total annual 
exports over the past ten years.”  This is important to Botswana’s growth, but just 47
having mineral wealth is no guarantee of economic success. We have seen, for 
instance, how Zimbabwe’s land was considered to be extremely valuable by the 
Rhodesian settlers, but it has slid into poverty. Botswana, by contrast, managed its 
natural wealth effectively, in part I have suggested because it experienced a political 
evolution different from Zimbabwe. Botswana’s history and culture created incentives 
demonstrably different than those that were given to Zimbabwe’s leadership after 
independence and these Botswanan incentives were crucial to its formation as a 
country.  
We see this difference in the leadership of the two countries. As as important as 
Seretse Khama’s governing philosophy was, he articulated an attitude which respected 
the interests of the Botswanan elites. It made sense for the Botswanan political elites to 
respect property rights. They had the property and they had corresponding political 
power. “After independence, cattle owners were the most important economic interest 
group and they were the most politically influential. The majority opinion was that 
47 Oliver Basedvant, “Are Diamonds Forever? Using the permanent income hypothesis to Analayze 
Botswana’s Reliance on Diamond Revenue.” March 1, 2008. Working Paper No. 08/80.  
35 
Botswana’s government was a government of ranchers.”  This is different than in 48
Zimbabwe where there was a social and political rift between the government and the 
white property owners - a rift which was influenced by factors historical and outside of 
economic reasoning. Robert Mugabe began his land reform in election year, when he 
sought to rally popular support and also placate his political allies. Botswanan political 
culture never experienced the violence that Zimbabwe’s did, and conflict and the 
language of it was less meaningful. This analysis helps explain why there was never 
racial and political tension in Botswana the way there was in Zimbabwe. But why was 
the Botswanan political elite protected from populist economic anxiety? It had a 
disproportionate amount of property. The questions to be asked are why were there not 
calls for a Botswanan land reform act firstly and secondly why did Botswana’s elite not 
exploit the pop]litical and economic factors which together were very beneficial to them? 
These questions deserve exploration. 
 Botswana’s socio-economic condition can be understood by examining the 
words of Seretse Khama himself. As early references Khama said, “Over half the 
national horde is owned by men with more than fifty cattle, and nearly, 14,000 out of a 
total of nearly 48,000 farmers in the tribal areas, where 86 percent of our cattle are but 
this does not mean that we are divided up between big ranchers and landless peasants. 
The traditional system has a strong welfare element which helps to offset the apparent 
economic imbalance.”  This element of Botswana’s culture is significant. Botswana’s 49
48 MIT Economics Department, “An African Success Story,” Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, JAmes 
Robinson. 2002. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3912. 
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institutions were not destroyed by its relatively light colonial occupation. Botswana’s 
relationship with its past, cherished by the country’s political elite, offer a cultural 
safeguard and convincing counter-narrative to thoughts of mass action to reconcile 
perceived economic imbalances.  
Botswana’s political leadership has been competent and has lacked the 
corruption exhibited in other countries. It is currently one of the least corrupt countries in 
Africa and has exhibited less corruption that some parts of Europe . This character trait 50
of Botswana’s governing class is partially explained by how safe from political harm it is. 
“First, it is important that elites did not oppose or feel threatened by the process of 
growth--they did not fear becoming political losers.” There was no need, in Botswana, 
for a redistribution of land to placate political groups. They were not struggling like those 
in Zimbabwe, whose political prominence was developed in a violent war with intrusive 
and symbolic colonial enemy. In the logic of the earlier established argument for 
property rights, overall production, as evidenced by Botswana’s high growth did not 
falter. These factors led to politics and economic development promoting each other. 
Botswana’s post-independence political elites have benefited from economic conditions 
that they’ve had no incentive to change. As Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson put it, 
“no group wanted to fight to expand its rents at the expense of ‘rocking the boat. ’  This 51
is notable different from other African countries such as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe where the 
idea of a sort “rocking the boat” was instrumental to their conceptions of government 
policies. 
50 Transparency International. Paul Banoba. “A Defining Movement for Africa. February 21, 2018. 
51 An African Success Story. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson. 2002. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3912. 
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The relationship between Botswana’s upper and lower classes is still 
problematic. In 2015, Botswana was the third most unequal country in the world.  This 52
social system was partially created by the system of economics shaped by the 
decisions of Botswana’s elite economic actors. But the stability, respect for property 
rights, and gradualist competence of Botswana’s governmental institutions have played 
a role Botswana’s economic success. Botswana’s inequality has not prevented it from 
making a massive reduction in its overall poverty. “​The poverty gap eased from 11.7 
percent in 2002/03 to 6.2 percent in 2009/10, indicating that consumption has improved 
among the poor. Real consumption per capita rose 47.6 percent in rural areas 
compared to a nationwide real consumption per capita increase of 13.3 percent during 
the same period.” Botswana’s historical circumstances are unique. It had a unique 
colonial history, and it was governed by a tribe of individuals with special tastes. The 
incentives given to its elites contributed to poverty-reducing growth in Botswana but the 
distinctions between political cultures are both subtle and deeply meaningful. However, 
it holds true that Botswana’s development is important and bears a deep understanding. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Property rights are important to a country’s development for the simple fact that 
individuals who’ve cultivated their own productive capital understand use that capital 
52 “Income Growth in Rural Botswana Lits Thousands Out of Poverty and Decreases Poverty.” World 
Bank. Press Release. December 8th 2015. 
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more productively than those who haven’t. This is why countries that, for the most part, 
don’t interfere with their citizens right to own property freely typically see high levels of 
economic growth. This is easy to understand in Africa. African countries which have 
respected property rights have experienced relatively high levels of economic 
development. African countries which haven’t have seem economic stagnation. This is 
true in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Botswana, which protected property rights through its 
institutions, has seen high levels of economic development and Zimbabwe, which 
attempted to redistribute massive amounts of land, has seen economic stagnation and a 
lack of growth. If interferences in property rights do happen, their specific nature is 
fundamental to their success. 
Zimbabwe and Botswana had very different experiences as English colonies. 
Zimbabwe was colonized by ruthless resource driven exploiters who fought a brutal war 
with the indigenous population. The Rhodesian government was an open and visible 
symbol of hatred which galvanized local groups against it. The Rhodesians war against 
the leaders of what would be independent Zimbabwe created a powerful narrative to 
justify land reform. This land reform was rhetorically focused around resolving past 
issues with a wealthy white minority. The Zimbabwean leadership and much of the 
country’s violent history with that white minority pushed Robert Mugabe’s government to 
attempt to do too large a reform too quickly and gave rhetorical justification to 
governmental incompetence and corruption. Botswanan locals had a much less violent 
relationship with its white settlers than Zimbabweans did. This allowed its 
post-independence leadership to cultivate the country’s native pre-colonization 
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traditions. Botswana’s government did not stress retribution against the English. It was 
also greatly influenced by powerful agricultural influences which had no desire to see a 
redistribution of land. In direct contrast to Zimbabwe, Botswana’s agricultural property 
owners had a clear role in its political process while the white farm owners were seen by 
the government as an enemy in Zimbabwe. The countries were also driven by the 
characters of their two post-independence leaders. Seretse Khama was part of a 
tradition of political leaders who pragmatically adapted to English imperial power while 
Robert Mugabe spent much of his early years being politically oppressed by the 
Rhodesian government. Both countries, like many other new nations, are products of 
economics, political culture, and certain important individuals. 
I argue that the narrative I explored gives credence to the policy idea that 
developing countries should respect the property of individuals, and not attempt major 
political redistributions of land. I’ve drawn this conclusion from two major reasons. The 
first is that well utilized property such as arable land gives its largest benefit from merely 
being used well. In a country with a market economy production is distributed to the 
entire country which benefits its economy as a whole. I believe evidence for this can be 
found in the drop in agricultural Zimbabwe experienced after its largest attempt at land 
reform. Botswana refused major land redistribution, and its GDP per capita and many of 
its overall standards of living have increased dramatically. I also argue that the skill of a 
country’s bureaucracy is incredibly important, and it often takes many years for a 
country to develop independent and competent administrators. Even if Zimbabwe’s 
attempt at land reform was not inherently corrupt, its implementation of it was marred by 
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the corrupt and self-serving actions of Robert Mugabe’s government.  From my 
research, I’ve come to the conclusion that developing countries should avoid putting the 
means of production under political control because government agents are often 
flawed, and increasing production by letting people use capital they’ve cultivated 
efficiently is the most important necessity to any developing economy.  
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